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Opponents of the various permutations of the doctrine of original intent
view the Bill of Rights as a flexible instrument for expanding the rights of
new generations of Americans. They find in the language and history of
the Constitution values which, when applied to current circumstances,
yield new principles for modern times. Ironically, many of these same
people object to applying the underlying values of the First Amendment to
the relatively new medium of broadcasting. They have urged that broad-
casting, unknown at the time of the framing of the Constitution and thus
not having been within the original intent, is not entitled to the same First
Amendment protection as the print medium, and, therefore, that its con-
tent may be regulated in the public interest.2
In fact, traditional constitutional analysis leads to a far different result.
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1. See H. STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN OR LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY 64-66 (1852).
2. See, e.g., The No Uncertain Terms of John Dingell, BROADCASTING, Mar. 5, 1984, at 53,
where John Dingell, the Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, argued:
Go over to the Capitol for me, would you, please? Between the House floor and the gallery is
a staircase, and there's a huge picture at the head of it. It's the signing of the Constitution of
the United States . . . . Go over and look at it, and then come back and tell me how many
television cameras and how many radio microphones you find in it. And then tell me that the
founders had in mind radio or TV when they drafted the Constitution and the first 10
amendments.
Of equal irony, many of those who associate themselves with the doctrine of original intent have had
no difficulty in recognizing comprehensive First Amendment protection for broadcasters. See, e.g.,
Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Bork, J.) (suggesting that Supreme Court recognize equal constitutional protection for print and
broadcast media), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987); Letter from Assistant Attorney General John
Bolton to Senator Daniel Inouye (Aug. 7, 1987) (objecting to S. 1277) (on file with the FCC Office of
Cong. and Pub. Affairs).
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The guiding principle of the First Amendment could not have been
clearer. Its purpose was to protect the press from the government. It was
not designed to protect the government from the press or to authorize gov-
ernment regulation of the press under the guise of protecting First
Amendment values. This principle applies at all times to all media. How-
ever, the courts have yet to recognize this obvious truth.
The difficulties experienced in applying First Amendment principles to
new media have not been limited to broadcasting. Motion pictures and
cable television are primary examples. While the law is now established
in the area of motion pictures,' the Supreme Court is only beginning to
grapple with the problems of cable television." In broadcasting, cable, and
other newer media, the Court appears to be having conceptual difficulty
because the line between what is government and what is private has been
blurred as government has itself engaged in more speech activities,5 has
subsidized others,' and has conferred regulatory benefits on particular
speakers.7
The courts have by far had the greatest difficulty in the area of broad-
casting. Until now, the courts have afforded broadcasting a lesser degree
of protection than traditional media. However, they may be on the thresh-
3. Initially, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not apply at all to motion
pictures. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Indus. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). More recently, it has
recognized the existence of broad protection, but has permitted administrative censorship. See Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (government may require that motion pictures be submitted to
censorship board before release); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)
(noting that different First Amendment standards may apply to motion pictures).
4. In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986), the Court held that
cable television "plainly implicate[s] First Amendment interests," id. at 494, but explicitly did not
decide whether the First Amendment standard for the print media or the broadcast media applied. See
id. at 496-97 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Left unresolved was the question whether there were justi-
fications, such as natural monopoly or the limitations of space on utility poles, for limiting First
Amendment protection. See Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1358 (1987); Pacific W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F.
Supp. 1322, 1330-39 (E.D. Cal. 1987); Group W Cable v. City of Santa Cruz, 669 F. Supp. 954,
959-67 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Century Federal v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465, 1470-78 (N.D.
Cal. 1986), appeal dismissed, 108 S.Ct. 1002 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (school newspaper
operated as part of the public school curriculum held subject to editorial control of school system);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding city ban of political advertising
on city-owned buses).
6. For example, the government has subsidized public broadcasting. See FCC v. League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down a statute prohibiting federally funded public
broadcasters from editorializing).
7. For example, the government has allocated the spectrum to broadcasters through its licensing
process.
The Court also appears to have encountered difficulties because of the increasing prevalence in
modern society of corporate, as opposed to individual, speech. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (striking down prohibition on inclusion of inserts discuss-
ing controversial public policy issues in monthly electric bills); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978) (state prohibition of corporate speech on public issues unconstitutional).
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old of accepting the principle that at least the core First Amendment pro-
tections against government control of content must apply to the broadcast
medium as well as to the print medium.'
This Article looks in depth at the consequences of such a holding. It
first addresses the current state of broadcast content regulation, then
describes the constitutional issues which are now being brought before the
courts for a second and more searching look. The Article next turns to the
questions that full First Amendment protection in the broadcast medium
may pose for the future of the broadcast industry. The Article concludes
that full First Amendment protection is critical to preserving the indepen-
dence and vitality of the broadcast medium.
I. The Scope of Broadcast Content Regulation
Effective broadcast regulation began with the Radio Act of 1927.' Reg-
ulation to allocate and assign licenses was necessary because of the great
demand for radio frequencies and the interference among existing sta-
tions."0 The scheme of regulation set by the 1927 Act continued in the
Communications Act of 1934,"1 and that Act still governs the broadcast
industry today. A central function of federal regulation in the broadcast
field is the assignment of frequencies to competing applicants through a
licensing system.' 2
When a frequency becomes available for broadcasting, applications for
the station license are received and considered comparatively if there are
multiple applicants. When a license is awarded, it is only for a limited
period (recently extended to five years in television and seven in radio),
and the existing licensee must apply for renewal at the expiration of the
period." Although they rarely do so, competing applicants may also apply
for the frequency when the license expires, and a license may be awarded
to a competing applicant. Typically, however, the license of the existing
broadcaster is renewed. Regulation of existing licensees is largely dele-
gated to the Federal Communications Commission (the Commission)
8. As discussed below, the Federal Communications Commission has held the fairness doctrine,
which requires the presentation of opposing views on various issues, unconstitutional. That case is
now on review in the District of Columbia Circuit. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043
(1987), petition for review pending, Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 1987).
9. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
10. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969); see also National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 211-13 (1943).
11. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (1982); See National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. at 213.
12. Substantial, but limited, portions of the spectrum are set aside for AM and FM radio, and
VHF and UHF television. Licenses for exclusive use of a frequency are awarded by the Federal
Communications Commission. 47 U.S.C. § 307 (1982).
13. Id. § 307(c).
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under a "public interest" standard,14 although Congress in the past has
imposed some specific regulatory requirements and appears increasingly
interested in doing so. 5
Programming has received particular attention in the intervening sixty
years since the passage of the 1927 Act, and there has been no dearth of
content regulation by the Congress and Commission. Despite significant
deregulation of broadcasting by the Commission,"6 much content regula-
tion remains, in large part because of congressional resistance to deregula-
tion in this area. 7
Congress has been particularly concerned with content regulation
designed to serve the interests of congressional candidates. It included in
the 1927 Act, and continued in the 1934 Act, a provision requiring broad-
casters who give or sell time to a political candidate to give or sell equal
time to opposing candidates.' 8 In 1972, Congress adopted Section
312(a)(7), guaranteeing "reasonable access" for federal, but not state and
municipal, candidates; in other words, Congress guaranteed federal candi-
dates the right to buy broadcast time during political campaign periods.' 9
At the same time Congress adopted provisions guaranteeing candidates the
lowest unit rate for purchases of political time.2" Congress has also sought
to limit the right of public stations to editorialize" and has barred them
from endorsing political candidates.22
14. Id. § 303.
15. See Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1329. That continuing budget resolution forbade the Commission
to use appropriated funds to abolish minority and female preferences in its licensing proceedings or its
distress sale or tax certificate policies, to diminish the number of VHF channel assignments for public
television stations and to reconsider the existing newspaper-television cross-ownership ban or extend
any temporary waivers of the rule. The prohibition on extension of temporary waivers was struck
down in News America Publishing v. FCC, No. 88-1037, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1988).
16. Much of the deregulation has been outside the area of content, for example, the relaxation of
the multiple ownership rules discussed infra note 106, but there has been some deregulation within
the content area as well. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707
F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding elimination of program quantity guidelines and formal ascer-
tainment requirements and redefining general public interest standard for programming).
17. Thus, for example, Congress in recent years has persistently declined to eliminate the specific
statutory program requirements discussed below, despite Commission proposals that it do so. FCC
Legislative Proposals Uan. 30, 1986) (on file with FCC Office of Cong. and Pub. Affairs). Commis-
sion action to eliminate the fairness doctrine and a Court of Appeals holding that the doctrine had not
been codified by earlier legislation, Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d
501, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987), led to congressional proposals to
codify the doctrine. See infra notes 69, 107.
18. Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982)).
19. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982).
20. Id. § 315(b).
21. Id. § 399; see FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 381-83 (1984) (invalidating
this provision).
22. 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982), relating to indecency discussed
infra note 31 and accompanying text. Other limitations have been adopted relating to commercial
speech: 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982) (cigarette advertising); 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982) (lotteries); 47
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The Commission, acting under the public interest standard of the Com-
munications Act, has adopted additional specific regulations governing the
content of broadcasting. Its 1940 Mayflower Broadcasting Corp. decision
prohibited editorializing by all commercial broadcasters.23 In 1949, while
overruling Mayflower, it articulated the fairness doctrine, requiring broad-
casters who editorialize and otherwise treat controversial issues of public
importance to present opposing views.24 In 1968, the Commission, as a
corollary to the fairness doctrine, adopted the personal attack rule,2
which guarantees to individuals who are attacked in the course of a dis-
cussion of controversial issues the right to personally appear and reply
regardless of the truth or falsity of the charge, and the political editorializ-
ing rule, 6 which gives candidates the right to reply to editorials opposing
them or favoring their opponents.27
The Commission's regulation has not been limited to imposing reply
requirements. It has also prohibited speech in the broadcast medium that
is permitted in other media. Thus, the Commission has prohibited "stag-
ing" by broadcasters, 8 that is, the deliberate falsification of news, whether
or not there is any damage to reputational interests. 9 With an exception
for favored program categories, the Commission has effectively barred net-
work programming for one hour each evening on affiliated stations in
order to encourage the growth of non-network programs.30 It has sought
U.S.C. § 317 (1982) (payola). In discussing Commission program requirements in this Article, I am
not referring to those requirements relating essentially to commercial speech, which present markedly
different First Amendment questions. See generally Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of
Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding restriction on advertising of casino gambling); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down ban on
promotional advertising by electric utility company).
23. 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940).
24. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Another aspect of the fairness
doctrine requires broadcasters to cover controversial issues of public importance. Because that aspect
of the fairness doctrine closely parallels the so-called responsive programming obligation discussed
below, it is not separately treated. In 1959, when Congress exempted news and news-related pro-
grams from the equal time requirements, it gave the Commission authority to apply the fairness
doctrine in the exempt areas. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). The contention that Congress codified the
fairness doctrine in 1959 has recently been rejected. See Telecommunications Research & Action
Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 517-18 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
25. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1987); see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-75
(1959).
26. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1987).
27. See Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (applying fairness doctrine
to ballot advertising); see also In re Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970) (applying "equal time"
principles to appearances of candidate supporters).
28. See, e.g., Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
29. No such policy has been upheld for the print press. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials can recover for damage to reputational interests but only if statement
made with actual malice).
30. See Mt. Mansfield Television v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court has
held in other areas that "the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment
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to regulate the broadcast of indecency pursuant to a congressional statute,
to bar from most broadcast hours material that is not obscene but that
contains "language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards . . . sexual or excretory activities
and organs . "8... 1
Perhaps the most important Commission program regulation has been
the consideration, in the course of the licensing process itself, of overall
programming. In the early days, the Commission held that proposed pro-
gramming by new applicants was a factor to be weighed comparatively in
determining who should be granted a broadcast license. 2 In 1965, the
Commission, suddenly aware that it had been deluged with false promises
of twenty-four-hour-a-day local, live, informational programming, then
the most favored type, changed the rules and stated that in the future,
except in unusual circumstances, it would not consider proposed program-
ming by new applicants as a basis for preferring one applicant over
another. 8 But the Commission continues to consider past programming,
both in determining whether a renewal applicant licensee is qualified to
continue as a broadcaster and in determining whether, in comparing the
renewal applicant with a new applicant, the existing station should pre-
vail. 4 That consideration takes three forms.
First, in order to be qualified, a broadcaster, during the past license
period, must have broadcast some minimum amount of programming
. . " Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 790-792 (1978).
31. FCC v Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 732 (1978) (quoting In re Pacifica Found. Station
WBAI, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975)); see In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 3 FCC Rcd 930 (1987),
petition for review pending, No. 88-1064 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1988); see also Illinois Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (affirming Commission's issuance of forfei-
ture against licensee that broadcast radio call-in programs on sex-related topics); Yale Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.) (affirming Commission's actions regulating drug-oriented
music played on radio stations), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 914 (1973); In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d
408 (1970) (issuing Notice of Apparent Liability to radio licensee that broadcast various expletives
during interview with rock musician).
32. Commission Policy on Programming, 20 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1901, 1915-16 (Aug. 3, 1960);
see, e.g., Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); see also
Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
33. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397 n.9 (1965). How-
ever, new applicants must propose at least a minimum amount of responsive programming. See Appli-
cation for Construction Permit for Commercial Broadcast Station, § 4 (Program Service Statement)
(1986) (available from FCC Office of Cong. and Pub. Affairs). The unusual circumstances in which
the Commission will consider proposed programming comparatively include proposals for Spanish
language programming, see, e.g., In re American Int'l Dev., 86 F.C.C.2d 808, 818 & n.55 (1981); In
re Broadcast Communications, 93 F.C.C.2d 1162, 1169-71 (Rev. Bd. 1983), and for programming
that is particularly sensitive to minority needs and interests, see, e.g., In re La Fiesta Broadcasting
Co., 6 F.C.C.2d 65 (Rev. Bd. 1966).
34. The concept of qualification means that there is no statutory or Commission bar to granting
the license to a particular applicant. If an applicant is qualified, the Commission will judge it compar-
atively against competing applicants. See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast
Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179, 1182 (1986).
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"(responsive" to community needs and interests.3 5 This type of program-
ming is also relevant to the so-called renewal expectancy discussed below.
Second, if a licensee has violated a Commission rule or policy during the
past license period, including those relating to programming, it may be
found to be unqualified." If there is an issue as to a broadcaster's qualifi-
cations, so-called meritorious programming may be considered in mitiga-
tion of violations of the Commission's rules and policies.3" The program-
ming considered in that context also appears to be the same type
considered in the context of the renewal expectancy.
Third, and most important, every broadcaster facing an actual or poten-
tial challenge from a competing applicant wants to assure its right to a
renewal expectancy. This is, in effect, a presumption that the broadcaster
is entitled to renewal of its license. If awarded, that expectancy will virtu-
ally assure renewal for a broadcaster who is otherwise qualified. That
expectancy will outweigh the stellar attributes that a competing applicant
may have in other areas deemed significant by the Commission, such as
diversity of broadcast ownership, integration of ownership and manage-
ment of the station, and minority and female ownership. 8
A broadcaster receives a renewal expectancy largely by convincing the
Commission that it has a meritorious past broadcast record.3 9 In the past,
the Commission counted heavily the quantity of news, public affairs, and
other informational and local programs broadcast by the licensee, and it
would compare a renewal applicant's performance in these categories with
that of other existing broadcasters.40 Recently, the Commission has
35. See Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1432-34
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Compliance with this requirement is judged by looking at the quarterly "issues/
programs" lists that licensees are required to keep in their public files. They show programming that
the licensee has presented which responds to community needs and interests. See 47 C.F.R. §
73.3526(a)(8) (1987).
36. See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179,
1208-20 (1986).
37. See RKO General, Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting In re RKO
General, Inc. 82 F.C.C.2d 291, 318 (1980)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927, 457 U.S. 1119 (1982).
38. See, e.g., Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1084 (1983); see also Reexamination of the Commission's Comparative Licensing Distress Sales &
Tax Certificate Policies Premised on Racial, Ethnic or Gender Classifications, I FCC Rcd 1315
(1986). The scope and significance of these factors is described infra text accompanying notes 83-87.
39. At one time, the District of Columbia Circuit had held that a licensee's programming had to
be "superior" and not just "substantial" in order to warrant a renewal expectancy. Central Fla.
Enters. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, 56-58 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 957 (1979). In an
appeal from a second Commission decision after remand, however, the court held that "substantial" or
"meritorious" programming would be sufficient. Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 506
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). As discussed below, programming is not the
only ingredient of the renewal expectancy.
40. See, e.g., Central Fla. Enters., 683 F.2d at 503-10; Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968,
982-83 (1981), affd in part, remanded in part sub nom., Office of Communications of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMM'N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES (1946). In passing, one might
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changed the standard to make clear that what counts is not the absolute
quantity of informational and local programming, but the amount and
nature of programming that has been responsive to the problems, needs,
and interests of the community, as those needs have been "ascertained" by
the licensee, usually through discussions with community leaders.41 A
renewal expectancy is established in the course of a license renewal hear-
ing by presenting evidence of the community problems, needs, and inter-
ests that the licensee has "ascertained," together with a showing as to the
programming broadcast during the license period that discussed those
problems, needs, and interests.42
The Commission's recent revision of the comparative standard does not
constitute a radical change,4 but it is fair to say that under both the old
standard and the new standard, no one is quite sure how to measure a
meritorious past programming record. In the last several years, the Com-
mission has rejected proposals to adopt a quantitative standard for meas-
uring meritorious performance,44 and indeed even stopped keeping and
publishing statistics on the amount of such programming.46 The Commis-
sion's adjudicative decisions have offered little guidance in determining the
existence of a meritorious record. The consequence of this lack of
question just why the Commission should give such weight to informational programs as opposed to
entertainment programs, particularly those that deal with public issues such as AIDS or poverty. See
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1981) (noting different regulatory
treatment).
41. At the same time, the Commission has deemphasized the importance of locally produced pro-
grams, recognizing that network and other non-locally produced programs may also respond to local
needs. See Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements &
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1092 (1984),
rev'd in part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see
also Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 982-83. Formal ascertainment procedures are no longer
required. Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements &
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1097-1101; Deregu-
lation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 993-99.
42. Community leaders also play a role in the renewal process as public witnesses, testifying to
the responsiveness of the station's programming in serving particular needs. Because of this commu-
nity leader role, broadcasters may intentionally avoid offending community leaders to help to assure
the absence of adverse testimony and the support of community leaders in renewal proceedings.
43. See Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements &
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d at 1095-97; Deregula-
tion of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d at 984-90.
44. See, e.g., National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
45. See Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, &
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 104 F.C.C.2d 357, 371-72 (1986).
As the Commission has recognized, setting standards for meritorious performance would itself raise
constitutional problems. See National Black Media Coalition, 589 F.2d at 581. In 1981, the Commis-
sion released a Notice of Inquiry to gather information on how to define meritorious service for the
purpose of gaining a renewal expectancy, Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal
Applicant, Stemming From the Comparative Hearing Process, 88 F.C.C.2d 120 (1981), but to this
date the Commission has taken no further action in that proceeding. Congress has also considered
proposals in this area. See, e.g., S. 1277, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1987); H.R. 3493, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1987).
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standards and meaningful precedent is that a meritorious broadcast record
is whatever the Commission says it is in any particular case.
To be sure, in recent years the Commission has not finally taken away
a television license from a renewal applicant on comparative grounds,4
and it has been criticized for being overly favorable to existing broadcast-
ers in its renewal rulings, most pointedly by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Central Florida Enterprises v. FCC.47 It is nonetheless trou-
bling that there are virtually no articulated guidelines for this important
type of Commission program regulation.
Not only have existing licensees routinely earned renewal expectancies,
but also the record of broadcasters' compliance with the specific program
requirements has been impressive. It would be the envy of any other regu-
latory agency. Few licenses have been lost in recent times as a result of
broadcaster non-compliance with specific program requirements."8 While
some may attribute the routine awarding of renewal expectancies and the
record of compliance with specific requirements to undue Commission fa-
voritism to broadcasters,49 I think there is another explanation. Broadcast-
ers are simply unwilling to test the outer limits of Commission regulatory
power because of the enormous consequences of losing a license, which in
a major television market may be worth hundreds of millions of dollars."0
This reluctance is exacerbated by the high cost of defending Commission
46. But cf. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (license
awarded to competing applicant; existing station treated as equivalent to new applicant because of
special circumstances), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
47. 683 F.2d 503, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In one case, the Commission, in apparent response to the
suggestion from the Court of Appeals, awarded the license of a classical music station to a new appli-
cant on the ground that the existing station had done almost no informational programming. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision not to award the licensee a renewal expectancy,
but it remanded the case because the Commission had failed to give the existing station sufficient
credit for integration and diversification. Committee for Community Access v. FCC, 737 F.2d 74
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
48. But see, e.g., Immaculate Conception Church v. FCC, 320 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam)
(renewal denied because licensee had made program proposals in bad faith and had altered program
logs), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 904 (1963); In re WMJX, 85 F.C.C.2d 251 (1981) (renewal denied
because licensee had broadcast false news items and deceptive contest announcements); In re Brandy-
wine Main-Line Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970) (renewal denied because licensee failed to comply
with fairness doctrine, thus raising inference that licensee misrepresented its intention to comply with
doctrine), affid, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973); In re Palmetto
Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962) (renewal denied on alternative grounds of broadcast of inde-
cent language and lack of candor in representations to Commission). Licenses have of course been lost
for failure to comply with laws regarding lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982), and payola, 47 U.S.C. §
317 (1982), but those raise different constitutional questions. See supra note 22.
49. For example, the court in Central Florida Enterprises was "troubled by the fact that the
record remains that an incumbent television licensee has never been denied renewal in a comparative
challenge." 683 F.2d at 510 (emphasis in original).
50. See TV's, BROADCASTING, Feb. 8, 1988, at 72-73.
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proceedings" and the uncertain constitutional protection afforded
broadcasters.
II. The Limited Constitutional Protection for Broadcasters
From 1927 to the present day, only once has the Supreme Court held
any regulation of broadcast content unconstitutional. That case was FCC
v. League of Women Voters,52 which invalidated a prohibition on editori-
alizing by public stations that receive federal funds. Even that decision
was by the narrowest of margins.5" Yet it is reasonably clear that none of
the programming rules or policies described in the preceding Part would
be constitutional if applied to the print press.54 In fact, merely proposing
such restrictions for the print press would now be viewed as being insensi-
tive to First Amendment values. 55
One may ask what permits content regulation with respect to the
broadcast press. Apart from some muddled claims about the public's own-
ing the airwaves, 8 broadcasting as a privilege, 7 or broadcasting's being
unduly powerful, 8 the large majority of broadcast content regulation is
justified on the so-called "scarcity" theory, articulated by the Supreme
51. Even if a broadcaster were certain of ultimate success, it would often be reluctant to take
actions that would increase the risk of challenge because the defense of a comparative proceeding may
run into millions of dollars. See Communications Daily, Oct. 20, 1987, at 4; D. Patrick, Remarks
Before the Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters 8-9 (Apr. 12, 1988) (Chairman, FCC) (on file with author).
Even the cost of defending against a fairness complaint can be substantial. See In re Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), petition for review pending, Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 24, 1987); Inquiry Into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules & Regulations Concerning
Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145,
164 (1985).
52. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
53. The Court was split 5-4. Id. at 365, Broadcasters have not fared any better in the courts of
appeals. There, too, there has been only one final decision striking down program regulation, and it
too involved public broadcasting. See Community Serv. Broadcasting of Mid-America v. FCC, 593
F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).
54. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (invalidating
rule requiring public utilities to place newsletters of third parties in billing envelopes); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating right of reply law); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down statute allowing prior restraints); see also supra notes 29-31.
55. But see Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967) (proposing access rights for the print press).
56. See Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility of the Broadcaster: Reflections on Fairness and
Access, 85 HARV. L. REv. 768, 783 (1972). Despite the frequency with which this claim is made, it is
interesting that the framers of the Radio Act of 1927 did not view the regulatory scheme as founded
on the concept of public ownership of the airwaves. See 68 CONG. REc. 2870, 2872 (1927) (remarks
of Sen. Dill) ("The Government does not own the frequencies, as we call them, or the use of frequen-
cies. It only possesses the right to regulate the apparatus . . . . We might declare that we own all the
channels, but we do not.").
57. Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
58. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 507-08
(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
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Court in 1969 in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC."9 The theory is
that since the government excludes certain individuals from broadcasting
because of the scarcity of available frequencies, the government has a
right, and perhaps even an obligation, to regulate the content of broadcast-
ing to ensure that the public can hear the excluded voices."0 This is said to
serve the public's "paramount" First Amendment interest in access to
diverse voices.6"
Few clear principles emerge from judicial discussion of the scarcity the-
ory other than that broadcast content regulation is to be judged not by the
compelling interest standard that is applied in other First Amendment
areas, 2 but by a standard under which courts will uphold regulation that
is "narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest."'
The scarcity theory has been much criticized in the legal literature,"" and
a recent decision of the District of Columbia Circuit has urged that the
Supreme Court discard the scarcity theory as incompatible with First
Amendment principles. 6
59. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,
210-13 (1943). Another justification, which appears only to apply to the regulation of indecency, was
articulated by the Supreme Court in the Pacifica case in 1978, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726
(1978), and has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., M. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX
OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST (1986); Wing, Morality
and Broadcasting: FCC Control of "Indecent" Material Following Pacifica, 31 FED. COMM. L.J.
145 (Winter 1978); Dyk, Book Review, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 131, 136-41 (Feb. 1988); Note, Regula-
tion of Programming Content to Protect Children After Pacifica, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1377 (1979);
The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Leading Cases, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 148-63 (1978). Pacifica
stated the theory that unsupervised children may be protected from hearing broadcast speech which is
indecent but not obscene. See In re Infinity Broadcasting, 3 FCC Red 930 (1987) (stating that protec-
tion of children justifies indecency regulation), petition for review pending, No. 88-1064 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 28, 1988). Again, a different rule appears to apply to the print press. Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (invalidating law banning books with "potentially deleterious influence" on
children). But cf. Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 636 (1988) (raising questions as
to whether adult access to printed materials can be impaired in order to protect children). Interesting
as this second justification is, the remainder of this Article concerns only the scarcity theory.
60. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
61. Id. One properly may be skeptical as to whether the voices excluded from station ownership
by the licensing process are the ones that benefit from Commission content regulation.
62. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1447-54 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
63. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984); see also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Quincy Cable, 768 F.2d at 1454.
64. See, e.g., L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1987); M.
SPITZER, supra note 59; Blake, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: Fairness and the Emperor's
New Clothes, 23 FED. COMM. B.J. 75, 87-89 (1969); Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to
Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982); Goldberg & Couzens, "Peculiar Char-
acteristics": An Analysis of the First Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 26-30 (1978); Krattenmaker & Powe, The Fairness Doctrine Today: A Constitu-
tional Curiosity and an Impossible Dream, 1985 DUKE L.J. 151, 155; Powe, Or of the [Broadcast]
Press, 55 TEX. L. REV. 39, 55-58 (1976); Schenkkan, Power in the Marketplace of Ideas: The
Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. L. REV. 727, 740 (1974).
65. Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 506-09 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987). Notably, the opinion by Judge Bork was joined by then
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In the midst of all this uncertainty surrounding the scarcity theory, the
Commission, newly converted to the view that its own regulatory activities
raise substantial First Amendment questions, has rendered a decision of
enormous constitutional significance: the Syracuse Peace Council decision
held the fairness doctrine unconstitutional on the ground that it chills pro-
tected speech, involves impermissible government oversight of broadcast
content, and serves no substantial governmental purpose because of the
plethora of alternative views available in broadcasting and other media."6
Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of this decision is the Commission's
alternative rationale, its "preferred" view, 7 that any regulation of broad-
cast program content would be unconstitutional unless the same type of
regulation would be constitutional as applied to the print press. The Com-
mission's view that "full First Amendment protections against content reg-
ulation should apply equally to the electronic and the printed press," 8
has also been expressed by the President in vetoing legislation to codify
the fairness doctrine" and by the Department of Justice in commenting
on a pending bill to strengthen Commission content regulation in the li-
cense renewal process. 0
At the same time that it held the fairness doctrine unconstitutional, the
Commission, in apparent contradiction of its present view that broadcast-
ing and the print press should be treated identically, tried to preserve the
public interest standard. It stated that it "may still impose certain condi-
tions on licensees in furtherance of its public interest obligation," and that
"[niothing in this decision . . . is intended to call into question the valid-
ity of the public interest standard under the Communications Act."'
Apparently, the Commission sought to preserve the responsive program-
ming obligation discussed earlier, as well as make clear that other types of
non-content regulation were not affected."
judge, now Justice, Scalia. See also Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (section 315 held
constitutional; similar question raised), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988).
66. In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), petition for review pending, Nos. 87-
1516, 87-1544 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 1987). In so holding, the Commission was following an apparent
invitation by the Supreme Court in the League of Women Voters decision to reconsider the constitu-
tionality of the doctrine. See 468 U.S. at 376 nn.11-13.
67. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5057.
68. Id.
69. See Veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 715
(June 29, 1987); see also H.R. REP. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1987) (dissenting views on
Fairness in Broadcasting Act); S. REP. No. 34, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1987) (minority views of
Sen. Packwood).
70. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General John Bolton to Senator Daniel Inouye (Aug. 7,
1987) (objecting to S. 1277) (on file with the FCC Office of Congressional and Public Affairs).
71. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5055.
72. One aspect of the fairness doctrine, the requirement that broadcasters cover controversial
issues of public importance, closely parallels the responsive programming obligation. While holding
the entire fairness doctrine unconstitutional, the Commission took pains to point out that the respon-
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There is currently litigation as to the correctness of the Commission's
decision on the fairness doctrine, and there will be equal controversy and
litigation as to whether the other specific program obligations should suf-
fer a similar fate." But perhaps far more important is the question
whether there is a principled distinction between invalidating the fairness
doctrine and other specific program regulations, while continuing to
enforce the responsive programming obligation.
To be sure, the Commission's primary rationale in the Syracuse Peace
Council decision would not affect the responsive programming obligation
since that rationale rests in large part on the chilling effect of the fairness
doctrine and the particular opportunities for intrusive government over-
sight in its enforcement."' The imposition of the responsive programming
obligation would not appear to chill broadcast speech in the same way as
the fairness doctrine, the equal time requirement in Section 315, and
other reply requirements.75 It is also far less content-specific and involves
less specific government oversight, for (at least at present) the Commission
is not telling the broadcaster whether particular speech is favored or disfa-
vored, required or not required, but only that the broadcaster's speech
must relate to community problems, needs, and interests that the broad-
caster itself has determined to exist.76 Relating programming to the com-
munity's problems, needs, and interests is itself good journalism, and often
good business because of the appeal of such programming to the local
audience. It is thus far from clear that the responsive programming re-
quirement has had a material impact on programming content, or that the
sive programming obligation was not being held unconstitutional. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC
Rcd at 5048; see also P. Dennis, Remarks Before the Federal Communications Bar Association, New
York Chapter (Nov. 5, 1987) ("The Public Interest Standard - Life After Meredith") (on file with
author). In its Reconsideration Order, the Commission suggested that the first part of the fairness
doctrine, standing alone, might be constitutional and that, in any event, the "[i]ssue responsive obliga-
tions remain in full force and effect . In re Syracuse Peace Council, FCC 88-131, slip op. at 19
(Apr. 7, 1988).
73. See Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (equal time requirement of Section 315
constitutional), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220 (1988). It may be argued that, even if the fairness
doctrine is unconstitutional, regulation of candidate appearances is still permissible. See First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (prohibition of corporate speech on public issues impermissible,
though prohibition of corporate contributions to candidates permissible).
74. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75. Those reply requirements chill speech because a broadcaster can escape those obligations by
avoiding in the first instance programming that triggers those obligations. The licensing process may
also inhibit controversial broadcast speech, but less noticeably.
76. The Commission has made quite clear that it will not second-guess the broadcaster's ascer-
tainment or ordinarily fault the broadcaster for failing to address particular ascertained problems in
its programming. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5052; Inquiry Into Section 73.1910 of
the Commission's Rules & Regulations Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine
Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 190-92 (1985); In re Patsy Mink, 59
F.C.C.2d 987 (1976).
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responsive programming obligation is unconstitutional under the Commis-
sion's primary rationale for invalidating the fairness doctrine.
But if the Commission's alternative "preferred" rationale in the Syra-
cuse Peace Council decision prevails and if the broadcast press and the
print press are equally protected from content regulation, the responsive
programming obligation may well be held unconstitutional despite the
Commission's suggestions that it could survive such equality of treatment.
The Commission is requiring broadcasters to do some minimum amount
of responsive programming to be qualified for renewal and, presumably,
to do a somewhat larger amount of responsive programming to garner a
renewal expectancy. It has offered to mitigate violations of other Commis-
sion requirements by considering responsive programming. The govern-
ment surely cannot regulate the amount of informational content of a
newspaper or insist that it be responsive to community problems, needs,
and interests.7 The risks are simply too great, the argument goes, that the
government would impose its perceptions of what the audience ought to
see or hear and that the government, in doing so, might seek to serve its
own interests. Protection from such government oversight, it can be urged,
is what the First Amendment is all about.
I do not plan to offer here a resolution of these difficult constitutional
questions, though it does seem to me that principled distinctions can be
made between specific content regulation, such as the fairness doctrine,
and the responsive programming obligation on which the renewal expec-
tancy is founded. There may well be an opportunity to address these
questions further in the cases that are currently being litigated. The more
interesting, and even more difficult, issue is: what would happen if all
Commission content regulation of protected speech were held
unconstitutional?
III. A Dialogue Concerning the Consequences of Full First Amendment
Protection for Broadcasting
So far the approach of most broadcasters has been to seek maximum
First Amendment protection, but some have suggested that broadcasters
should be concerned that their exclusive licenses may be put in jeopardy
if, as a result of these efforts, the Commission is barred entirely from
regulating program content.7 8 Let us suppose that the Commission's deci-
77. Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (impermissible for Postmaster General to
base second-class mailing privilege on normative evaluation of periodical's content). But see UNITED
STATES POSTAL SERV., DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL § 423 (effective Dec. 20, 1987) (giving special
second-class rate to organizations whose "primary purpose" is informational).
78. Similar worries have already begun to concern the cable industry. See infra note 114 and
accompanying text.
Vol. 5: 299, 1988
First Amendment and Broadcasting
sion in the fairness proceeding were upheld by the Supreme Court in a
case which we will call Red Lion I. It overrules Red Lion I, and,
rejecting distinctions between the fairness doctrine and other content regu-
lation, it does so on the ground that all content regulation of protected
speech in broadcasting, including the responsive programming obligation,
violates the First Amendment, unless the regulation could be constitution-
ally imposed on the print press." I offer this dialogue between B, a
broadcast representative who favors full First Amendment rights, BB, a
second broadcaster, and G, a proponent of the old regulatory order, as a
mechanism for raising some of the questions that would have to be
addressed.
B: Have you read the Red Lion II opinion? It's a real victory for
broadcasters.
G: A real victory for broadcasters?! I think they'll live to regret it.
B: That's provocative and smacks a bit of your being a sore loser. Why
so?
G: Members of Congress are afraid of the power of broadcasters, and
many of its most influential members are fond of referring to broadcasters
as being arrogant bastards.8" You know that John Dingell and others
have threatened broadcasters with a major revision of the statutory
scheme8 that could result in auctioning frequencies or distributing them
by lottery if the fairness doctrine were invalidated. Now here you are.
B: Well, it may be that Congress did not have to create general purpose
broadcasting in the first place, but it cannot come in now and simply do
away with existing broadcast licenses, and redistribute them by auction or
lottery. That would raise serious First Amendment problems.
G: I don't see why. There is no obligation to continue to devote any
part of the spectrum to general purpose broadcasting.
B: Perhaps not, but in the First Amendment area there are plenty of
cases which hold that the government may not deny someone a privilege
for an unconstitutional reason. 82
79. We will assume that the opinion in Red Lion II was modeled after language in the majority
opinion in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987). It is far from certain that this sweeping result would necessarily
follow from invalidation of the fairness doctrine, but it is certainly possible. See supra notes 71-77
and accompanying text.
80. E.g., Network's Image Problem, BROADCASTING, Jan. 14, 1985, at 138 (remarks of Rep.
Swift referring to television networks). G is overstating; most members of Congress have a close, one
might say symbiotic, relationship with their local broadcasters, but view the networks and the industry
as a whole with suspicion.
81. Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1934 Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1987) (statement of Rep. Dingell); J. Dingell, Remarks Before the National Association of
Broadcasters (Mar. 1, 1988) (on file with author).
82. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984) (denial of federal
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G: Those cases aren't much help to you. They all turn on a finding of
improper purpose, and you would have a hard time with that here.
B: Well, I am not so sure. If Congress did away with the existing
licenses because broadcasters had successfully asserted their constitutional
rights, I think the congressional action might well be found to be
unconstitutional.
G: Well, I think you're attributing an improper purpose to Congress
where no such purpose exists. Revision of the statutory scheme follows
naturally from the holding in Red Lion H because one of the fundamental
tenets of the regulatory scheme, the ability of the Commission to regulate
programming, has been undermined. But Congress doesn't have to do a
thing anyway. The existing system has already been sunk. Ask yourself:
What is going to happen to the renewal expectancy that broadcasters so
cherish as a way of securing the near-perpetual renewal of their broadcast
licenses?
B: I admit that is a bit of a problem.
G: It's more than a bit of a problem. Content is at the heart of the
current renewal expectancy. 8 If the broadcaster does not have a renewal
expectancy, it almost certainly will lose its license in a comparative pro-
ceeding to a new applicant who will receive credits for integration, diver-
sification, and minority and female ownership that are not available to
most of the existing licensees.8 ' While these credits are not sufficient to
outweigh a renewal expectancy,8" in most cases they would almost cer-
tainly outweigh any other comparative enhancement afforded to existing
licensees.86 Also, the meritorious programming defense would be lost as a
method to mitigate violations of Commission rules and policies.87
B: You have me there. But the Commission should be able to come up
with something. For example, the Commission could adopt a policy that
funding of public broadcasting stations if they editorialize); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972) (denial of tenure due to teacher's public criticism of state college); Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (denial of public employment due to teacher's letter in newspaper criticizing
allocation of school funds); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958) (denial of tax exemption for
veterans who refused to take loyalty oaths).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
84. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The minority and female preferences themselves
raise constitutional questions, but not under the First Amendment.
The reason that a new applicant would prevail in most circumstances is that a large number of
broadcast stations are owned by entities that have other broadcast interests, and hence fare poorly on
the diversification criterion. Still fewer are owned by minorities and women, or involve integration of
ownership and management, that is, a situation in which the owners participate in operating the
station on a day-to-day basis. See Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503, 507-09 (D.C. Cir.
1982). If broadcasting and print are entitled to the same First Amendment protections, these integra-
tion and diversification criteria may themselves be constitutionally suspect, however.
85. See Central Fla. Enters., 683 F.2d at 503.
86. See supra note 84.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
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would result in renewal of existing broadcast licenses so long as the
existing licensee were found to be qualified, that is, if the existing licensee
had, during its license term, complied with the Commission's rules and
policies. By this mechanism the Commission could assure stability in the
industry.
G: By "assure stability in the industry," I assume you mean broadcast-
ers could get their licenses renewed pretty much automatically.
B: Well, that wouldn't be much of a change from the situation now.
Some broadcasters have been found to be unqualified on grounds unre-
lated to programming. That would continue. In fact, almost no one has
ever been disqualified on grounds relating to programming," and no tele-
vision broadcaster has ever lost a license on comparative grounds, a phe-
nomenon about which the District of Columbia Circuit has, I think inap-
propriately, chided the Commission in the past.8"
G: But what you are proposing is dispensing with the traditional com-
parative criteria and telling the broadcaster that he will get renewed if he
is found qualified. That can't be done by the Commission. You know that
under the Supreme Court's decision in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC90
and the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Citizens Communica-
tions Center v. FCC,1 the Commission is barred by statute from taking
that step. It has to allow the filing of competing applications even if the
broadcaster is qualified, and it has to consider them comparatively.
B: I think you're probably right that under the existing statute the
Commission can't renew broadcasters automatically simply because they
have been found to be qualified, but I still think that, consistent with
those cases, the Commission can refashion the renewal expectancy to elim-
inate consideration of content. There's nothing that would bar the Com-
mission from giving a renewal expectancy based on a licensee's knowledge
of the community, its ascertainment of community needs and interests,"2
the participation of its station management in community activities, its
non-program policies, and its equal employment opportunity performance.
In fact, those are already ingredients of the renewal expectancy.'3 Under
88. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
90. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
91. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
92. Presumably, this would not be formal ascertainment. See Revision of Programming & Com-
mercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements & Program Log Requirements for Commercial
Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1097-1101 (1984), rev'd in part sub nom. Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968,
993-99 (1981), affid in part, remanded in part sub nom., Office of Communications of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC 707, F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
93. See, e.g., In re Tele-Broadcasters of California, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 223, 227 (Apr. 30,
1985); In re United Broadcasting Co., 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 885, 891 (]an. 14, 1985); In re
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this approach, the Commission would continue to impose requirements on
the process, but not on the end product.9
G: That step constitutes a really radical revision of the standard, and it
is hardly consistent with Citizens, which made clear that "incumbent
licensees should be judged primarily on their records of past
performance. '"9
B: Well, the simple answer to that is that Red Lion II held that aspect
of the Citizens decision unconstitutional; program content may no longer
be taken into account.
G: But if the statutory criterion for judging the renewal expectancy has
been held unconstitutional, then doesn't Congress have to go back to the
drawing board and itself refashion the renewal expectancy?
B: I don't read Citizens as holding that the statute required considera-
tion of programming as part of the renewal expectancy. After all, the
whole notion of a renewal expectancy is Commission-invented.96 I don't
see why the Commission itself can't appropriately revise its standard for
renewal expectancy in the light of Red Lion JJ.97
G: I'm still dubious. After all, you're proposing that the Commission
give a renewal expectancy even if the broadcaster puts on entertainment
programming twenty-four hours a day, no news, no informational pro-
gramming, and no local programming.98
B: It's a theoretical possibility that a broadcaster might do that, but I
think it's highly unlikely that many stations would react that way. After
Pillar of Fire, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 601, 612 (Dec. 21, 1984). There is a question as to whether
these elements of a refashioned renewal expectancy would be constitutional if applied to the print
press.
94. In a recent speech, Commission Chairman Patrick suggested that the Commission could fash-
ion a non-content-based renewal expectancy and consider "other evidence of past performance ....
Patrick Makes a Case for Cleaning Up Comparative Renewal, BROICASTING, Mar. 7, 1988, at 76.
95. Citizens Communications Center, 447 F.2d at 1213.
96. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 854-55 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
97. While the renewal expectancy notion is probably not statutory, there is certainly legislative
history to suggest that Congress contemplated some consideration of programming in the course of
licensing. See generally Rosenbloom, Authority of the Federal Communications Commission, in app.
I to FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN BROADCASTING (J. Coons ed. 1961). Compare National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (statute requires regulation of composition of
traffic) with FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 603 (1981) (declining to consider
whether Commission's policies for nonentertainment programming comply with Communications
Act). I would urge that the consideration of programming is not so integral to the statute that invali-
dation of that approach by Red Lion II would undermine the entire statutory scheme. After all, the
Commission, even without benefit of a constitutional holding, has largely eliminated all consideration
of programming in new licensing. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Black Citizens
for a Fair Media v. FCC, 719 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (upholding simplified postcard license
renewal form), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984).
98. For example, G might point to the existence of the Home Shopping Network which provides
"[flive, discount shop-at-home TV service." BROADCASTING CABLECASTING YEARBOOK 1987 E-8.
Under the present regulatory scheme, it also provides informational programs.
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all, as the Commission has already concluded, there's a public demand out
there for news programming quite apart from any Commission require-
ment.99 Regulation or no regulation, the marketplace will keep news on
the air. In network television, there is a substantial demand for public
affairs programming. After all, for many years, 60 Minutes has been near
the top of the ratings. I will grant you that the audience demand for
locally-produced public affairs programming in both television and radio
may not be as great, and the ratings are generally lower for these pro-
grams than for non-network entertainment programs. But broadcasters
are responsible journalists, and they'll continue to produce these pro-
grams, just as their colleagues in the print press continue to publish infor-
mational material for which there is no specific public demand.' Broad-
cast stations, like newspapers, are selling a single product, and the product
as a whole is made materially more attractive by the inclusion of features
that in themselves may have a low audience. I note that the record of
television networks in presenting news and informational programming is
extraordinary.10' And as for being overly one-sided or offensive, broad-
casters abide by journalistic standards requiring balance,"0 2 and the mar-
ketplace generally imposes restraints in that area as well. Look at what
happened to that Utah station that put on the Aryan Nations Hour and
lost its advertisers.'08
G: Perhaps, but even if I concede that the existing renewal expectancy
standard is not statutory, the Commission's past approach was so long-
standing and the approach you suggest is, at least in theory, such a radical
change because it eliminates any consideration of programming by the
99. See Revision of Programming & Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements &
Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076, 1080-82 (1984),
rev'd in part sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968, 976 (1981), affd in part, remanded in part sub nom.,
Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v, FCC 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
100. This assessment may be more accurate for television than radio. Stone, Survey Finds Little
Effect from Deregulation, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, May 1985, at 14; Stone, Deregulation Felt
Mainly in Large-Market Radio and Independent TV, RTNDA COMMUNICATOR, Apr. 1987, at 9.
101. At CBS, for example, the amount of news and public affairs programming increased 600%
from 1950 to 1986, from 352 yearly hours in 1950 to 2129 hours in 1986. In 1986, it was almost one-
third of total programming. CBS Audience Services (Apr. 14, 1987) (on file with author).
102. See CODE OF BROADCAST NEWS ETHICS OF THE RADIO TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS
ASSOCIATION (1973) (on file with author) (stating that members believe "their prime responsibility as
journalists . . . is to provide to the public they serve a news service as accurate, full and prompt as
human integrity and devotion can devise"); CODE OF ETHICS OF THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL
JOURNALISTS/SIGMA DELTA CHI (1984) (on file with Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma
Delta Chi) (observing that "[njews reports should be free of opinion or bias and represent all sides of
an issue").
103. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at A30, col. 1.
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Commission, that the Commission should insist that the step be taken by
Congress rather than shape new policy itself.1"4
B: Well, I don't see why the Commission can't do it, but if the Com-
mission won't do it, I assume that broadcasters will be able to get some
relief from Congress, which will provide for automatic renewal of quali-
fied broadcasters or the fashioning of a non-content-based renewal
expectancy.
G: You must be kidding. Broadcasters have not had any significant
clout with the Congress for a long time. They lost the financial interest
and syndication fight,'05 the 12-12-12 fight, 06 and if Congress had had its
way, broadcasters would have lost the fairness doctrine fight too." 7
Broadcasters made the Democrats angry in the process.108 Programming
obligations have always been viewed as a trade for a near-perpetual
renewal of broadcast licenses. Now broadcasters have violated their part of
the bargain by getting content regulation held unconstitutional. Congress
certainly is not going to help them by revising the scheme to give them
near-perpetual licenses, at least not without exacting a heavy price.
B: Yes, broadcasters lost some fights. But the issues you cite weren't
life-threatening issues to most broadcasters. We were able to defeat the
proposed tax on the transfer of broadcast licenses because that issue
affected all of us who hold commercial broadcast licenses.109 That shows
that we can mobilize the industry when it counts. I also think we'll get a
lot of public support for our position. The public likes the service it's
getting.110 It's always hard for the public to understand why an existing
104. A similar approach was originally taken with respect to the fairness doctrine. See Inquiry
Into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness
Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 145, 148 (1985).
105. The financial interest and syndication rules regulate the financial interests that networks can
have in network and non-network programming. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1987). A Commission
proposal to repeal these rules lies dormant because of congressional objections. See, e.g., H.R. REP.
No. 2250, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
106. The Commission replaced its rule prohibiting persons from holding cognizable ownership
interests in more than 7 AM, 7 FM, and 7 TV stations, with a rule prohibiting such interests in more
than 12 AM, 12 FM, and 12 TV stations; the rule was to sunset after six years. Congress imposed a
moratorium on implementation of the new rule, Second Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-396, § 304, 98 Stat. 1423 (1984), and on reconsideration the Commission eliminated
the sunset provision and imposed a 25% ownership cap, Amendment of Section 73.3555, 100
F.C.C.2d 74 (1985).
107. Legislation codifying the fairness doctrine was originally passed by the House and the Sen-
ate, and vetoed by the President. Veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 715 (June 29, 1987). Thereafter, an effort to attach fairness codification to the
continuing budget resolution failed because of threats of a presidential veto. See The Rise and Fall of
the Fairness Doctrine Part III: The President Stands Firm, BROADCASTING, Dec. 28, 1987, at 31.
108. See Broadcasters and the Fairness Doctrine: Hearings on H.R. 1934 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9-10 (1987) (statement of Rep. Dingell); J. Dingell, supra note 81.
109. See Transfer Tax Defeated, BROADCASTING, Dec. 14, 1987, at 39.
110. See TIO/ROPER, AMERICA'S WATCHING: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVISION 2-3
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broadcaster should be kicked out in favor of some newcomer who is an
unknown quantity, has no experience, and is often in the business to make
a quick buck. Also, I assume that Congress isn't immune to the moral
force of a Supreme Court decision holding content regulation to be uncon-
stitutional. Now that the Supreme Court has sided with us on the content
issue, I think a lot of the congressional anger is going to subside. The
decline in the power and influence of the television networks, whose com-
bined audience share has fallen from over ninety percent of television
homes, to seventy-five percent of homes, has also made broadcasters a less
threatening force."' I think broadcasters can get renewal legislation that
will bar competing applications unless the renewal applicant is held
unqualified, and that we won't have to settle for merely a refashioned
renewal expectancy.
G: But the House Democrats just rejected that very approach."'
B: Yes, but only because they thought they could get a responsive pro-
gramming obligation."' No longer. Red Lion II makes that clear enough.
G: Okay. Suppose you do get the legislation. It would be unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment because it grants exclusive franchises
and entrenches the existing owners. The cable people could see that in
their industry. They saw that if the First Amendment applied, it meant
that existing franchisees could not be protected from new entrants. At
least they have had enough sense not to continue claiming full First
Amendment rights."" I call that good sense.
B: The cable situation is entirely different. In cable, the industry
wanted to keep its monopoly franchises, even though it's physically possi-
ble to have multiple cable franchisees." 5 In broadcasting, there are large
(1987) ("Americans see many more pluses than minuses in television today. This is demonstrated by
the fact that more than three times as many people call television 'generally good'(47%) as say it is
'generally bad' (14%).").
111. Ratings Down 10%, Shares Off Four Points, BROADCASTING, Nov. 9, 1987, at 35.
112. See H.R. 1140, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1987); see also FCC Legislative Proposals
32-33 (Jan. 30, 1986) (on file with the FCC Office of Congressional and Public Affairs) (similar
proposal by FCC not adopted by Congress).
113. S. 1277, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-02 (1987). B may be wrong about that. Congress
wanted much more. Among other things, the legislation would have limited the assignment or transfer
of a license by a licensee who held the license for less than three years. Id. § 201.
114. See Cable's Catch-22, BROADCASTING, Dec. 21, 1987, at 28-30. In the Preferred case
before the Supreme Court, the National Cable Television Association filed a brief in support of the
position of the unsuccessful applicant. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S.
488, 489 (1986). The cable industry wanted to establish First Amendment rights for cable, even at the
price of having to accept competing cable franchises. The industry's theory seemed to be that if anyone
could get a franchise, then there was no justification for content regulation. The industry apparently
has now rethought that position, and many cable owners are now more concerned about avoiding
opening the franchising process than securing full First Amendment protection.
115. While there may be some limit on the number of cable systems that can be accommodated on
existing utility poles, except in rare situations the demand is not likely to exceed the supply. In most
situations economic reasons render it unlikely that more than two franchises would be sought. Over-
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numbers of competing stations in the large majority of markets, and
licensing further stations in most instances simply is impossible.
G: Not necessarily. The spectrum allocated to broadcasting could be
expanded.' 16 But I agree there are competing uses, and that there is a
compelling interest in dividing up the spectrum, allocating it to particular
uses, and assigning licenses to avoid interference. That, I grant you, is
consistent with the First Amendment. So the cable industry is different.
But in other First Amendment areas scarcity or competing uses also exist,
and the Constitution demands content-neutral allocation of the available
opportunities."' If content regulation in broadcasting is to be proscribed
by the First Amendment, then we must go all the way to the print model.
That means that broadcast licenses must be allocated in some content-
neutral fashion, whether by auction or lottery.
B: It's obviously true that in the future the Commission can't consider
content in assigning new licenses, and I would provide for auctions or
lotteries for new broadcast stations in the legislation."' But I'm interested
in confirming existing licenses without a lottery or auction. Isn't that
permissible?
G: I don't think you can do that consistent with the First Amendment.
B: But existing licensees have been protected up to now.
G: That's true, but Red Lion II says we now follow the print model.
That, as I said, requires content-neutral allocation.
B: But why does it require reallocation? After all, newspapers have a
perpetual right to publish.
G: The print press is quite different. The existing newspapers are not
here because of government favoritism. We have agreed that the original
licensees in broadcasting were selected under an unconstitutional system.
Also, the existing licensees got renewals based on impermissible
considerations of program content. The only way to undo the improper
selections and renewals is to open it up all over again.
B: That makes no sense at all. The unconstitutional consideration of
programming harmed only the existing broadcasters who had to make
promises to get their licenses in the first place and had to conform to
Commission program expectations as a way of keeping their licenses.
build Battle Joined in Cherry Hill, N.J., BROADCASTING, Dec. 21, 1987, at 31.
116. Fowler & Brenner, supra note 64, at 222-23.
117. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965). In adjudicating access claims to public property, the Court generally insists on
content neutrality whether or not there is a scarcity of opportunity. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
118. All that would be required to accomplish this is an amendment to the existing lottery statute.
47 U.S.C. § 309 (1982).
Vol. 5: 299, 1988
First Amendment and Broadcasting
Why does the First Amendment require them to lose their rights to broad-
cast in order to set things right?
G: The unconstitutional content-based licensing scheme didn't just
harm the existing broadcasters. It harmed anyone who wanted to enter the
business. Competing applicants lost out to existing licensees under a sys-
tem that impermissibly provided for consideration of content. Even poten-
tial applicants who never filed suffered because of the existence of
improper content-based rules which deterred them from applying. Open-
ing up the system is particularly important because almost all available
broadcast licenses have been allocated. The Court of Appeals suggested
this in Citizens."9 In Red Lion I, the Court seemed to anticipate the very
problem we are talking about, and noted that even if spectrum scarcity
disappeared, there would still be concern about existing licensees having a
preferred position because of past government action. 120 You can't simply
close the system. You have to give some chance to the voices excluded by
past licensing decisions.
B: Wait a minute. Have you forgotten about the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, '2 which was cited with approval in Red Lion H? CBS v. DNC held
that the First Amendment does not require that members of the general
public be given access to broadcast facilities.' 22
G: CBS v. DNC involved public access to existing broadcast stations,
not access to the spectrum.
B: Sure, but there are plenty of cases holding that no one has a consti-
tutional right to have a broadcast license.' 3
G: Those cases don't say that there is no constitutional right to apply
for a license. In any event, you are forgetting that CBS v. DNC and all
these other cases rested explicitly on the existence of public interest pro-
119. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("As
new interest groups and hitherto silent minorities emerge in our society, they should be given some
stake in and chance to broadcast on our radio and television frequencies.").
120.
Even where there are gaps in spectrum utilization, the fact remains that existing broadcasters
have often attained their present position because of their initial government selection in com-
petition with others before new technological advances opened new opportunities for further
uses. Long experience in broadcasting, confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affil-
iation, and other advantages in program procurement give existing broadcasters a substantial
advantage over new entrants, even where new entry is technologically possible.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1943).
121. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
122. There, the Supreme Court held that members of the general public have no First Amend-
ment right of access to broadcast stations and that broadcasters cannot be compelled to sell time for the
discussion of public issues.
123. See, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388-89; National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
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gramming obligations in the broadcasters, and that Red Lion I clearly
suggested that those excluded from the broadcasting spectrum must be
accommodated in some fashion. If they cannot be accommodated by giving
them access under the old system through such requirements as the
fairness doctrine and equal time, then they have to be accommodated by
giving them a meaningful opportunity to apply for and secure a license.
B: There's no lack of opportunity for people to get licenses. They can
buy them.
G: That's partially true, but entirely irrelevant. You can't just have the
public debate dominated by those who have had the money to buy existing
broadcast properties.12'
B: Why not? All other press outlets are allocated that way, and so are
virtually all goods and services. Most of the existing licensees paid full
value for the stations they got.1" 5 If a few existing licensees who got
broadcast properties as a result of comparative renewal proceedings are
being given a windfall, I ask again, what's wrong with that? They were
selected under the old system, and they have performed honorably for
many years. They could have sold to others. Why can't they be confirmed
as licensees for the future?
G: Because the government is subsidizing the speech of the existing
broadcasters by giving them perpetual licenses. And that's true even of
licensees who bought their stations. Those stations will be more valuable
under the new statute, which will make the licenses more secure than they
were under the pre-existing system.
B: It is highly doubtful that confirmation of existing licenses would
make them any more valuable. Very few licenses were lost under the
existing system, and those that were lost, were lost unexpectedly. There is
very little discount in station prices attributable to that risk.'26 In any
event, the federal government can subsidize anyone it wants to.' 27 No one
124. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 412 U.S. at 121-23; see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943).
125. "[Alpproximately 71% of today's radio stations and 54% of today's television stations have
been acquired by the current licensees on the open market." In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC
Rcd 5043, 5055 (1987), petition for review pending, Nos. 87-1516, 87-1544 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24,
1987).
126. Existing stations are already selling at a high price/earnings ratio. Paul Kagan Associates,
Broadcast Stats (Oct. 23, 1987).
127. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984) (distinguishing Taxation With
Representation on ground that public broadcasting stations could not segregate their funds according
to source, but stating that denial of subsidy would be valid if they could do so); Regan v. Taxation
With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (holding that Congress can refuse to subsidize lobbying
activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations while still subsidizing lobbying activities of veterans'
organizations); see Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1732 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL to show that United States Postal Service grants a
special rate to "religious, educational, scientific, philanthropic, agricultural, labor, veterans', and fra-
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suggested that extending the license terms in radio from five to seven years
and from three to five years in television raised any constitutional
questions.
G: The government does not have unlimited power to discriminate
among selected speakers when it subsidizes.128 But I'll grant you that the
act of confirming the licenses of the existing owners probably isn't much
of a subsidy given prior Commission licensing practices and the almost
automatic renewal that those practices afforded to licensees. Perhaps what
we really have here is not a subsidy, but government action that has kept
everyone else out of the market, except a selected few.
B: It may be that originally those who were excluded might have had a
constitutional claim, but those licensing proceedings were litigated to a
conclusion long ago. The doctrine of res judicata bars any effort to
attempt to litigate now a constitutional claim which could have been liti-
gated then.1"9
G: I doubt that very much. All that was resolved at that time was the
right to the initial license. Licensing decisions are never really final and
legally complete. Every five or seven years licenses expire. All licensees
specifically agreed that they would acquire no ownership interest and
knew that they got their licenses for a limited period. 3
[Fortunately for B, who seems to be having some difficulty, he has
brought a friend along, BB.]
BB: I have been sitting here listening for a long time. Aren't you both
making this all too complicated? G, you are doing no more than threaten-
ing us with economic harm because we didn't knuckle under to your anti-
quated view of the First Amendment in broadcasting. I can't believe that
the First Amendment requires the result you propose. The supposed lack
of content neutrality in the issuance of existing licenses is a myth. The
selection process has been essentially content-neutral since at least 1965,
and even before then we all know that very few broadcasters got their
original licenses because of their program proposals. 3 I agree with you
that a renewal expectancy focused on programming has allowed them and
their successors to retain those licenses. But what difference does that
ternal organizations."). These cases raise the question of public broadcasting's continued vulnerability
to content regulation, an issue not addressed in Red Lion I1.
128. See Arkansas Writers' Project, 107 S. Ct. at 1722; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 97-105
(1976) (per curiam).
129. See generally C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 4401-73 (1981).
130. 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 309(h)(1) (1982).
131. Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397 (1965)
("[d]ecisional significance will be accorded only to material and substantial differences between appli-
cants' proposed program plans."). But see supra note 33 (discussing consideration of Spanish lan-
guage programming proposals and proposals sensitive to minorities' needs and interests).
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make? If they could have been confirmed as perpetual licensees right from
the start, so what if it took a few decades longer to get to that point?
G: You mean that if programming considerations didn't really play a
role in the original selection process, then the selection didn't rest on an
unconstitutional premise? Well, you have a point there, but what about
those cases where the original licensing did rest on consideration of
programming?
BB: First of all, I can't believe that those who failed to apply for the
licenses have any standing to complain about defects in the original licens-
ing process."3 2 Even those who did apply and were unsuccessful have no
standing to complain that the successful licensee got the license by will-
ingly accepting unconstitutional program obligations. 8
G: I agree that's merit to your argument. But suppose the standing
argument fails. After all, under the current system, listeners and viewers
have standing to complain about Commission actions,'"' and they may
well have standing to complain about the existing assignments. Let's also
assume that unconstitutional programming considerations did infect the
entire process. What then?
BB: Those are pretty dubious assumptions, particularly your assump-
tion about the importance of programming in the assignment process, but
I have an answer. You agree, I assume, that the existing licensees could be
confirmed if there were a compelling governmental interest.
G: Sure.
BB: Well, a compelling government interest does exist. It's the interest
in industry stability that you sneered at earlier. The Supreme Court in
the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting case, and even the
court of appeals in Citizens, recognized the importance of industry
stability.13 5
There's a particularly compelling reason not to disrupt the system here
132. Cf City of Angels Broadcasting v. FCC, 745 F.2d 656, 662-64 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming
Commission denial of motion to intervene in comparative proceeding because application for construc-
tion permit filed after "cut-off" point).
133. See, e.g., Berkshire Cablevision v. Burke, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful cable
system applicant had no standing to challenge condition imposed as requirement of license grant).
134. Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
135. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 804-09 (1978); Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But cf. Federal Radio
Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266, 282 (1933) (licensees are aware that statute authorizes Com-
mission to deny renewal if "necessary to produce an equitable result"). Ironically, the Commission in
its policy statement on tender offers and proxy contests has suggested that the industry benefits from
changes in ownership. In re Tender Offers & Proxy Contests, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1536,
1539-40 (Mar. 17, 1986), petition for review dismissed sub nom., Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Commission was not, however,
favoring uncompensated changes in ownership.
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by opening up existing licenses to new content-neutral allocation. Broad-
casters have invested billions of dollars in broadcast station licenses. What
you are proposing is the elimination of all of that investment. That is not
only unfair, but it would also cause extraordinary economic turmoil in the
broadcasting industry and widespread bankruptcies of existing licensees.
This would necessarily impair program service to the public. It is true
that new entities would be licensed on the existing frequencies, but I don't
have much confidence that they would serve the public as well as existing
licensees. Stability in the industry encourages long-term investment, rather
than the reaping of short-term profits. If the licenses were reallocated by
lottery or auction, the new licensees might well focus on short-term gain
and be quite reluctant to invest in informational and local programming
to the same extent as existing stations. If I had such a license, I'd be quite
concerned that Congress in the future might decide again to reassign the
licenses.136
The impact on broadcast journalism at local stations would be particu-
larly great. Broadcast journalism serves a critically important role in
informing and educating the American public. The recent Roper survey
shows that a majority of the American public relies on television as its
primary source of news.3 7 Reallocating existing licenses could effectively
destroy broadcast journalism as we know it today, at least at the local
stations.' 38
G: That may be important as a matter of administrative law, but it's
not constitutionally significant.
BB: Sure it is.' 39 Talk about the importance of preserving First
Amendment values! The First Amendment surely does not require Con-
gress to eliminate the broadcast press, or at least that part of it repre-
sented by the local stations. And in this delicate constitutional area, there
136. It seems unlikely that any auction or lottery would confer a permanent right to the frequency
since technological change could make it necessary to revise the system drastically at some future date.
See McLuhan's Revenge, BROADCASTING, Nov. 30, 1987, at 138 (possibility of exclusively wired
transmission of programming).
137. TIO/RoPER, supra note 110, at 4 ("Today, 66% of Americans mention television as a main
news source, compared to 36% who mention newspapers, 14% who cite radio, 4% who say
magazines.").
138. A substantial argument can be made that network news would not be adversely affected to
the same extent because the new station owners would affiliate with an existing network. But it is not
obvious that the new owners, seeking short-term returns, would support network journalism to the
same degree as at present. For example, they might decide not to clear low-rated network public
affairs programs to the same extent that they presently do, thereby undermining the necessary support
for such network programming.
139. See Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1729 (1987) (suggesting that
interest in encouraging fledgling publications might be compelling government interest).
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is a special deference due to the judgment that Congress made when it
passed the statute.1 4
Quite apart from these First Amendment considerations that favor
preservation of existing stations, we don't have to throw out all the
existing licenses just because the winds of constitutional doctrine have
shifted. The Supreme Court has been careful to protect reliance interests
when it radically alters the existing constitutional rules, and it declines to
apply new constitutional doctrine retroactively.' 4 ' The First Amendment
area is no exception. 42 The Court wants to avoid imposing significant
hardships as a result of unanticipated shifts in the governing constitutional
rules. As we have discussed, taking licenses away from existing licensees
would cause those licensees serious hardship, and the adverse effect
wouldn't be limited to the licensees, but would extend to the public that
they serve.
G: I can't deny that your points are powerful. But if the existing licen-
sees are to be protected, can't we at least make them pay a spectrum fee?
In other words, if they are going to receive perpetual licenses, is it really
too much to ask that they should pay an annual fee for the use of the
spectrum?" 3 We could use the proceeds to fund public broadcasting to
achieve program diversity in a constitutionally permissible way.
BB: Is that anything more than an improper selective tax on a part of
the press? I think it falls under Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers'
Project. "
G: Well B, your friend is pretty persuasive. I guess I would have to
140. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-81 (1984); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1973). But see Dyk, supra note 59, at
135-36.
141. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 301-02 (1975) (nonretroactive effect given to decision
striking down classifications restricting right of non-property owners to vote on bond issues); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam) (same). Reliance interests may be protect-
able even if the constitutional rules have not changed. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267 (1986) (striking down layoff provision of collective bargaining agreement which extended prefer-
ences to some minority employees).
142. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (plurality opinion) (declining to give
retroactive effect to decision striking down grant of state monies to private sectarian schools).
143. See J. Dingell, supra note 81.
144. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987) (unconstitutional for state to
impose tax on general interest magazines but not on religious, professional, trade, and sports jour-
nals); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)
(unconstitutional for state to impose tax that, among other things, singles out a few members of the
press); see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936); Erie Telecommunications v. City of Erie, 659 F. Supp. 580, 594-98 (W.D. Pa.
1987), appeal docketed, No. 87-3648 (3d Cir. Oct. 2, 1987).
Such a spectrum fee is clearly distinguishable from a payment by an applicant to secure a license in
an auction and from lease payments made by an applicant (if the government were to decide to lease
spectrum space). Those payments are fixed in advance, and the danger does not exist that fees will be
selectively imposed or increased because of the content of a licensee's speech, a danger which clearly
exists with respect to spectrum fees imposed on existing licensees.
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concede that the Supreme Court would probably sustain a statute con-
firming the licenses in existing broadcasters or creating a non-content-
based renewal expectancy. I have only one last question. What if Con-
gress doesn't go along? Where are you then?
BB: In terms of constitutional doctrine, that's a tough question. There
may be no way that existing broadcasters can claim a First Amendment
right to protection. For the moment, I have only a practical suggestion.
We had better improve our relations with Congress. It's hard. The gov-
ernment and the press are natural antagonists. We can only hope Con-
gress will learn from the Red Lion II opinion and respect broadcasters as
an important part of the American press. Red Lion II is sound, it's elo-
quent, it's the Supreme Court, and, as we found out in Marbury v.
Madison,"5 it's the Court that has the last word on the Constitution, not
the Congress.
It's also important that we educate the public about what the First
Amendment is all about if we are to get the public support we need.
Recent surveys suggest that the public doesn't understand the First
Amendment very well at all.""' It's a problem with our public educational
system that we don't teach more about the Constitution in high school and
even college. We as broadcasters bear some of the responsibility, and we
had better make an effort to educate if we want public support in the
crunch.
IV. Some Reflections on the Dialogue
In a very real sense, the dialogue Part of this Article has the issue
exactly backwards. The critical question is not whether securing expanded
First Amendment rights will make broadcasters more vulnerable to Con-
gress, but whether failing to secure greater First Amendment protection
will continue a vulnerability that now exists.
The existence of that vulnerability can hardly be questioned. The Dem-
ocratic Congress has assumed an active role in framing communications
policy and is not willing to leave that role to the Commission." 7 It has
also sought to influence the Commission's resolution of constitutional
issues in broadcasting.' 48 Such congressional activism may be the result of
145. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
146. See, e.g., TIMES MIRROR, THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS 9 (1986).
147. See, e.g., supra note 15 (discussing various restrictions incorporated into recent appropria-
tions legislation). See generally Shooshan & Krasnow, Congress and the Federal Communications
Commission: The Continuing Contest for Power, 9 COMM/ENT 619 (1987) (discussing congres-
sional checks on Commission decisionmaking).
148. The District of Columbia Circuit has admonished the Commission to ignore congressional
pressure. See News Am. Publishing v. FCC, No. 88-1037, slip op. at 34 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1988)
(citation omitted) ("removal of the legislative bar on consideration of News America's application will
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congressional mistrust of the Reagan Administration's Federal Communi-
cations Commission, but congressional interest in communications policy
is nothing new, and I strongly suspect that such interest will long outlast
the present Administration. And, Congress has almost always been less
sensitive than the Commission to First Amendment concerns. Congress
believes, based on current Supreme Court precedent, that it has extensive
regulatory power over broadcast programming, and it threatens to exercise
that power if broadcasters are uncooperative in taking "voluntary action"
with respect to programming." 9 Similarly, based on Supreme Court deci-
sions sustaining Commission structural regulation (for example, rules bar-
ring the ownership of a television station and a newspaper in the same
market) 5' Congress evidently believes that such regulation presents no
First Amendment problems.15 1 Congress has insisted that a number of
broadcast cross-ownership rules be retained.'52 It is also well known that
certain legislative agenda items of broadcasters are made more difficult to
obtain because of broadcasters' continuing insistence on greater First
Amendment protection, for example, in the area of the fairness doc-
trine. 5 But more fundamentally, the fact that broadcasters are viewed as
having lesser First Amendment rights than the print press creates an
atmosphere in which broadcasters are fair game for regulation generally.
The lack of broader First Amendment protection fosters an attitude that
broadcasters are less deserving of congressional respect and should be sub-
servient to the wishes of Congress. 5
In my own mind, there is little question but that securing greater First
leave in place the 'intense political ... pressure from Congress that gave rise to the Amendment
itself. That pressure must, of course, play no role in agency adjudications involving important consti-
tutional rights.").
149. Television violence, children's programming, and election projections are perennial candi-
dates for congressional attention, and while no legislation has been enacted in any of those areas, the
threat of such legislation has been used to coerce "voluntary" change. See Dyk & Goldberg, The First
Amendment and Congressional Investigations of Broadcast Programming, 3 J.L. & POL. 625,
630-31 (1987).
150. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
151. This assumption is not correct. See News Am. Publishing v. FCC, No. 88-1037, slip op.
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1988) (noting that unresolved First Amendment issues remain with respect to
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rules).
152. See supra note 15. Recent appropriations legislation bars the Commission from altering the
newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rules during the current fiscal year.,Congress has codified the
broadcast-cable cross-ownership rule. 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (Supp. III 1986). And it has discouraged
the Commission from more drastic changes to the multiple ownership rules and from repealing the so-
called syndication and financial interest rules. See supra notes 105-06.
153. See Short and Sweet, BROADCASTING, Feb. 22, 1988, at 210 (broadcaster efforts to secure
legislative action with respect to must-carry rules),
154. There is even some evidence that, on occasion, Congress regulates broadcasters in a purport-
edly content-neutral fashion in order to punish them for espousing critical views. See, e.g., News Am.
Publishing v. FCC, No. 88-1037, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1988) (noting possible congressional
motive to punish Rupert Murdoch for his editorial views, but invalidating legislation on alternative
ground).
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Amendment rights for broadcasters, either by invalidating specific pro-
gram requirements or by more broadly conferring on broadcasters the
same First Amendment rights as newspapers, would materially alter the
congressional view. Securing those broader First Amendment protections
would call into question not only direct program regulation, but a host of
other regulations that impose special requirements on the broadcast
press.155
Conclusion
As this Article suggests, there may be dangers in pursuing broader First
Amendment rights, but I believe that those dangers are largely theoretical.
There is nothing theoretical about the difficulties that broadcasters now
experience in their dealings with Congress as the result of their second-
class citizenship.
We stand watching, wondering whether Eliza will stay on the bank or
whether, in an act of courage, she will step onto the ice and begin her
journey to freedom.
155. If broadcasters had the same First Amendment protection as newspapers, it might be that
any regulation would be suspect if it singled out broadcasting for special treatment. See Arkansas
Writers' Project v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); see also News Am. Publishing v. FCC, No. 88-1037, slip
op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 1988) (suggesting that even under existing First Amendment standards for
reviewing broadcast regulation, legislation that singles out particular broadcasters may be unconstitu-
tional; striking down legislation directed at Rupert Murdoch which barred FCC from granting him
extension of temporary waivers under newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule).

